8/15/2023 0 Comments Spectre ghost malwareReading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfec6d. Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfec6c. Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfec6b. Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfec6a. Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfec69. Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfec68. It has the latest patches applied too (of course), but remains vulnerable (this one is one of the few runnings of the “Spectre PoC” that have errors on its output):īuild: RDTSCP_SUPPORTED MFENCE_SUPPORTED CLFLUSH_SUPPORTED microcode: Microcode Update Driver: v2.01, Peter Oruba This workstation has an up to date microcode on it: To be more clear, I think all is right on my set up. I would not trust a “hardened” processor released in the next months. It is the time a new microarchitecture needs to reach market since its initial design. They should release non-overpriced slow but “secure” processors to these customers.īy the way, I doubt there will be Spectre/Meltdown proof processors in less than five years. Hardware manufacturers should understand there is a market for security, even to end users. Something must be very wrong, one of the Meltdown/Spectre PoC is successful on it yet. Spectre and Meltdown checker ( ) believes it is secure (Spectre variant 1 by means of the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch, Spectre variant 2 by means of IBRS/IBPB and Meltdown by means of page table isolation. This computer is running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, fully patched, and has a Kaby Lake processor with microcode revision 84h (released two days ago). As said some days ago, I am testing Spectre/Meltdown fixes on a Linux workstation.
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